Published October 24, 2017
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Social Decision Functions and Strongly Decisive Sets
- Creators
- Packel, Edward W.
Abstract
Properties of the strongly decisive sets (some preference for x over y along with no preference for y over x allows coalitional enforcement of x over y) associated with a social decision function are investigated. The collection of such sets does not have the superset preserving property of filters, but is characterized by properties defining a target. A 1-1 and onto mapping is exhibited between the class of targets and a certain class of social decision functions, showing that such functions are completely characterized by the structure of their strongly decisive sets. The "ring" structure of targets is shown to be closely related to known results on veto hierarchies.
Additional Information
Revised. Original dated to October 1977. The author wishes to thank Professor John A. Ferejohn for providing motivation and valuable suggestions Published as Packel, Edward W. "Social decision functions and strongly decisive sets." The Review of Economic Studies 48.2 (1981): 343-349.Attached Files
Submitted - sswp193_-_revised.pdf
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sswp193_-_revised.pdf
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 82577
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20171023-103807912
- Created
-
2017-10-24Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 193