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Published October 24, 2017 | Submitted
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An Axiomatized Family of Power Indices for Simple n-Person Games

Abstract

In this probabilistic generalization of the Deegan-Packel power index, a new family of power indices based on the notions of minimal winning coalitions and equal division of payoffs is developed. These indices are axiomatically characterized and compared to other similarly characterized indices. Additionally, a dual family of minimal blocking coalition indices and their characterization axioms is presented.

Additional Information

Published as Packel, Edward W., and John Deegan. "An axiomated family of power indices for simple n-person games." Public Choice 35.2 (1980): 229-239.

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August 19, 2023
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