Published October 24, 2017
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Toward a Theory of Legislative Decision
Abstract
Recent developments in formal political analysis have spawned two seemingly related theories of democratic political processes. The more familiar of the two is the theory of electoral competition based on Downs' (1957) heuristics and greatly elaborated by Davis, Hinich and Ordeshook (1970), Kramer (1975), McKelvey (1976), and others. Somewhat less familiar (perhaps because the intellectual movement is less well integrated) is the theory of legislative decision which has grown from roots in game theory and the theory of social choice. Black (1958), Riker (1962), Plott (1967), Wilson (1969), Schwartz (1970), Kadane (1972), and several others have nurtured the rudimentary models which compose this theory.
Additional Information
Published in "Game Theory and Political Science" ed. by Peter Ordeshook & Richard McKelvey, New York University press, 1978Attached Files
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 82560
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20171020-163236278
- Created
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2017-10-24Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 206