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Published October 20, 2017 | Submitted
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Pairwise Symmetry Conditions for Voting Equilibria

Abstract

Necessary conditions are established for a point contained in the interior or boundary of a convex feasible subset of Euclidean space to be quasi-undominated in an anonymous simple game. Most of the conditions are behaviorally intuitive and imply pariwise symmetries among utility gradients.

Additional Information

This paper supplants its initial draft, which was circulated to a limited extent as "The Possibility of Voting Equilibria." Published as Matthews, Steven A. "Pairwise symmetry conditions for voting equilibria." International Journal of Game Theory 9.3 (1980): 141-156.

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August 19, 2023
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