Published October 16, 2017
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A Note on Rational Threats and Competitive Equilibrium
- Creators
- Reinganum, Jennifer F.
Abstract
Many economic problems can be modeled as n-person non-zero sum games. In such situations, there are gains to be had by coordination of strategies. Assuming there are no restrictions on side-payments, the players then bargain over the division of the gains. This note establishes that, for a restricted class of economic problems, the threat equilibrium in the bargaining game coincides with the perfectly competitive equilibrium.
Additional Information
Revised. Original dated to January 1980. The games described in this note are not repeated games; they are "one shot" games which may depend on the evolution of an economic variable (or stock) through time. Thus, this result has nothing to do with (and claims no applicability to) the repeated games problems.Attached Files
Submitted - sswp297_-_revised.pdf
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sswp297_-_revised.pdf
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 82349
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20171013-145934785
- Created
-
2017-10-16Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
-
2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 297