Published October 16, 2017
| Published
Report
Open
Collective Choice Mechanisms for Achieving Efficient Stock Market Allocations
- Creators
- Forsythe, Robert
Abstract
This paper examines two collective choice mechanisms for achieving efficient stock market allocations. The first, proposed by Helpman and Razin, is shown to have the property that an equilibrium rarely exists. An alternative mechanism, due to Hurwicz, is examined and it is shown that the resulting equilibria under this mechanism do exist and are efficient.
Attached Files
Published - sswp301.pdf
Files
sswp301.pdf
Files
(213.2 kB)
| Name | Size | Download all |
|---|---|---|
|
md5:7d6a6167baba3755a1ba7ee3638315c1
|
213.2 kB | Preview Download |
Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 82347
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20171013-142432231
- Created
-
2017-10-16Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
-
2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 301