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Published October 16, 2017 | Submitted
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Strategic Lobbying Behavior

Abstract

This paper analyzes strategic lobbying behavior under the assumption of disorganized opposition using an optimal control approach. Optimal rates of lobbying expenditure are shown to be increasing functions of time. A specific example is computed to determine the influence of various parameters. Next, the case of lobbying against an active counterlobby is considered in a game theoretic framework. The Nash equilibrium is computed for a specific game with symmetric players. The equilibrium rates of expenditure for the lobbyists may be either everywhere increasing, everywhere decreasing, or single peaked. In addition, some comparative statics results are reversed relative to those of the disorganized opposition model.

Additional Information

Later published as: Reinganum, J. F. (1983), A formal theory of lobbying behaviour. Optimal Control Applications and Methods, 4: 71–84. doi:10.1002/oca.4660040106

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