Published October 9, 2017
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Demand-Revealing Mechanisms for Private Good Auctions
- Creators
- Forsythe, Robert
- Isaac, R. Mark
Abstract
The set of demand revealing mechanisms for allocating private goods is characterized and examples are given. Auctions in which multiple units of either homogenous or nonhomogeneous commodities are studied and, in particular, it is demonstrated that there will generally not exist a demand revealing mechanism with which each bidder will pay the same price for each unit purchased. The experimental literature on these bidding mechanisms is discussed and several additional inquiries are suggested.
Additional Information
Published as Forsythe, Robert and Isaac, R. Mark. "Demand-Revealing Mechanisms for Private Good Auctions." in Research in Experimental Economics vol. 2, edited by Vernon Smith. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1982.Attached Files
Published - sswp351.pdf
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 82197
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20171006-163719005
- Created
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2017-10-09Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
-
2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 351