Published May 1982
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Market Power and Transferable Property Rights
- Creators
- Hahn, Robert W.
Abstract
The appeal of using markets as a means of allocating scarce resources stems in large part from the assumption that a market will approximate the competitive ideal. When competition is not a foregone conclusion, the question naturally arises as to how a firm might manipulate the market to its own advantage. This paper analyzes the issue of market power in the context of markets for transferable property rights. First, a model is developed which explains how a single firm with market power might exercise its influence. This is followed by an examination of the model in the context of a particular policy problem
Additional Information
Revised. I would like to thank Jim Quirk, Roger Noll and Jennifer Reinganum for providing useful input to this effort. Any remaining errors are solely the responsibility of the author. Published as Hahn, Robert W. "Market power and transferable property rights." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 99.4 (1984): 753-765.Attached Files
Submitted - sswp402_-_revised.pdf
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 82090
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20171004-153511320
- Created
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2017-10-04Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers, Environmental Quality Laboratory
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 402