Welcome to the new version of CaltechAUTHORS. Login is currently restricted to library staff. If you notice any issues, please email coda@library.caltech.edu
Published October 4, 2017 | Submitted
Report Open

Continuum and Finite-Player Noncooperative Models of Competition

Abstract

The anonymous interaction of large numbers of economic agents is a kind of noncooperative situation which is markedly different from small-numbers strategic conflict. The mathematical model of a nonatomic game, or a game with a continuum of players, has been introduced as a model for these many-agent situations on the basis that its equilibria should closely approximate those of games with large finite numbers of players. This paper contains a precise definition of what it means for a nonatomic game to be the limit of a sequence of finite-player games, and a theorem which states when the limit of equilibria of finite-player games will be an equilibrium of the nonatomic limit game. This is analogous to theorems prompted by Edgeworth's conjecture in core theory. It is derived from a general set of sufficient conditions for the graph of a noncooperative equilibrium correspondence to be closed.

Additional Information

I would like to thank Marcus Berliant, Donald Brown, Tatsuro Ichiishi, Ariel Rubenstein and Hugo Sonnenschein for their thoughtful comments on early drafts of this paper. Published as Green, Edward J. "Continuum and finite-player noncooperative models of competition." Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society (1984): 975-993.

Attached Files

Submitted - sswp418.pdf

Files

sswp418.pdf
Files (812.3 kB)
Name Size Download all
md5:26e6f34b3b6667e9fbe3e003544879ea
812.3 kB Preview Download

Additional details

Created:
August 19, 2023
Modified:
January 14, 2024