Continuum and Finite-Player Noncooperative Models of Competition
- Creators
- Green, Edward J.
Abstract
The anonymous interaction of large numbers of economic agents is a kind of noncooperative situation which is markedly different from small-numbers strategic conflict. The mathematical model of a nonatomic game, or a game with a continuum of players, has been introduced as a model for these many-agent situations on the basis that its equilibria should closely approximate those of games with large finite numbers of players. This paper contains a precise definition of what it means for a nonatomic game to be the limit of a sequence of finite-player games, and a theorem which states when the limit of equilibria of finite-player games will be an equilibrium of the nonatomic limit game. This is analogous to theorems prompted by Edgeworth's conjecture in core theory. It is derived from a general set of sufficient conditions for the graph of a noncooperative equilibrium correspondence to be closed.
Additional Information
I would like to thank Marcus Berliant, Donald Brown, Tatsuro Ichiishi, Ariel Rubenstein and Hugo Sonnenschein for their thoughtful comments on early drafts of this paper. Published as Green, Edward J. "Continuum and finite-player noncooperative models of competition." Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society (1984): 975-993.Attached Files
Submitted - sswp418.pdf
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 82011
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20171003-151303475
- Created
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2017-10-04Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 418