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Published October 4, 2017 | Submitted
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Group Concentration and the Delegation of Legislative Authority

Abstract

This paper takes an initial stab at the delegation question. What incentives lead legislators to delegate not only the administration but even the formulation of public policy to unelected officials? A variety of considerations are relevant, but my focus will be on political (rather than managerial) incentives to delegate. The next section of the paper develops a simple framework in which the later discussion can be conducted.

Additional Information

Originally prepared for the Conference on Social Science and Regulatory Policy, Reston, Virginia—January 22-23, 1982. I am grateful to Roger Noll and Peter Aranson for useful comments on an earlier version.

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