Published September 27, 2017
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The Great Fish War: A Cooperative Solution
- Creators
- Cowens, James
- Lewis, Tracy
Abstract
The competitive al location of a common property resource is analyzed taking explicit account of the fact that the resource users must confront each other repeatedly. This means that future retaliation for noncooperatrve behavior is possible. The likelihood of enforcing cooperative behavior with the credible threat of retaliation is analyzed using the theory of repeated games.
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Submitted - sswp448.pdf
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sswp448.pdf
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 81859
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170926-155902237
- Created
-
2017-09-27Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
-
2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 448