Published September 25, 2017
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Rational Expectations and the Aggregation of Diverse Information in Laboratory Security Markets
- Creators
-
Plott, Charles R.
- Snyder, Shyam
Abstract
The study explores the information aggregation properties of experimental markets in which a fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium exists. In single securities markets in which traders have different preferences, information aggregation seems to be minimal, and rational expectations equilibrium are not attained. If the market has a complete set of contingent claims securities or if preferences are identical, the rational expectations equilibrium model works well.
Additional Information
The authors gratefully acknowledge the financial support of this research which was provided by the National Science Foundation, Caltech Program for Enterprise and Public Policy, the University of Chicago Institute of Professional Accounting, and the Indian Institute of Management at Ahmedabad. Published as Plott, Charles R., and Shyam Sunder. "Rational expectations and the aggregation of diverse information in laboratory security markets." Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society (1988): 1085-1118.Attached Files
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 81784
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170922-165501575
- NSF
- Caltech Program for Enterprise and Public Policy
- University of Chicago Institute of Professional Accounting
- Indian Institute of Management at Ahmedabad
- Created
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2017-09-25Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 463
- Other Numbering System Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Other Numbering System Identifier
- 463