Bargaining Theory and Portfolio Payoffs in European Coalition Governments 1945-1983
- Creators
- Laver, Michael
- Schofield, Norman
Abstract
The distribution of cabinet posts in multiparty coalition governments in twelve European countries in the period 1945-1983 is considered. The efficacy of three payoff theories, namely Gamson's proportional payoff, the kernel and the bargaining set, as predictors of portfolio distribution, are compared. It is found that the Gamson predictor is superior in five countries which tend to be characterized by a relatively unfragmented political system, while the bargaining set is more appropriate in the highly fragmented political systems. The kernel can be disregarded as a payoff predictor. The results provide some empirical justification for the restricted (B2) bargaining set as a payoff predictor in simple voting games with transferable value.
Additional Information
This material is based upon work supported by a Nuffield Foundation Grant on Political Stability. An earlier version was presented at the European Public Choice Meeting, Hanstholm, Denmark, April 1983. Thanks are due to Ian Budge, Bill Riker and Bernie Grofman for their comments and for making available their un published work, and to Sean Bowler for his research assistance. Published as Schofield, Norman, and Michael Laver. "Bargaining theory and portfolio payoffs in European coalition governments 1945–83." British Journal of Political Science 15.2 (1985): 143-164.Attached Files
Submitted - sswp490.pdf
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 81707
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170921-152153125
- Nuffield Foundation
- Created
-
2017-09-22Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 490