Published September 21, 2017
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Full Nash Implementation of Neutral Social Functions
- Creators
- Strnad, Jeff
Abstract
This paper characterizes neutral social functions that are fully implementable. A necessary condition for full implementation under either the Nash equilibrium concept or the strong Nash equilibrium concept is that the neutral social function being implemented be monotonic and simple. If a neutral monotonic social function is simple and the set of winning coalitions is nondictatorial then the social function is fully implementable by a set of Nash equilibria. For finite alternative sets a neutral monotonic social function will be fully implementable by a set of strong Nash equilibria if and only if it is simple and dictatorial.
Additional Information
Revised. Original dated to October 1983. This article is derived from a chapter of my Ph.D. dissertation, Strnad (1982). I have profited greatly from the suggestions and guidance of Donald Brown in this work. Any remaining errors are solely my responsibility. Substantial financial support for this work has been provided by Summer Research Grants for 1981 and 1982 from the University of Southern California Law Center. Published as Strnad, Jeff. "Full Nash implementation of neutral social functions." Journal of Mathematical Economics 16.1 (1987): 17-37.Attached Files
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 81689
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170921-132224090
- University of Southern California
- Created
-
2017-09-21Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
-
2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 500