Published September 20, 2017
| Submitted
Report
Open
Bargaining Theory for Games with Transferable Value
- Creators
- Schofield, Norman
Abstract
This paper presents an existence proof of a bargaining equilibrium set B*, in the case of games with transferable value, by making use of the Knaster Kuratowski Mazurkiewicz (KKM) Theorem. As a corollary proof of existence of the usual bargaining set B1 is obtained. Whereas previous proofs of B1 existence have made use of fixed point arguments, use of the KKM theorem provides an insight into possible extensions of the existence proof to the nontransferable value case.
Additional Information
This material is based on work supported by a Nuffield Grant on Political Stability. Thanks are due to Kim Border for making available his unpublished manuscript, and to Graciela Chichilnisky for helpful discussion on her unpublished work.Attached Files
Submitted - sswp509.pdf
Files
sswp509.pdf
Files
(268.5 kB)
| Name | Size | Download all |
|---|---|---|
|
md5:1a7dd1243d24a3994bc857b7c45ab5b1
|
268.5 kB | Preview Download |
Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 81643
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170920-152358814
- Nuffield Foundation
- Created
-
2017-09-20Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
-
2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 509