Published December 1985
| public
Journal Article
More on Harsanyi's utilitarian cardinal welfare theorem
- Creators
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Border, K. C.
Chicago
Abstract
If individuals and society both obey the expected utility hypothesis and social alternatives are uncertain, then the social utility must be a linear combination of the individual utilities, provided the society is indifferent when all its members are. This result was first proven by Harsanyi [4] who made implicit assumptions in the proof not actually needed for the result (see [5]). This note presents a straightforward proof of Harsanyi's theorem based on a separating hyperplane argument.
Additional Information
© 1985 Springer-Verlag. Received: 21 September 1984; Accepted: 25 October 1984. I wish to thank Stephen Selinger for pointing out Resnick's argument to me and W. A. J. Luxemburg for a useful discussion which simplified the argument.Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 81563
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170919-101333544
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2017-09-19Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2021-11-15Created from EPrint's last_modified field