Reconciliation and the Size of the Budget
- Creators
- Ferejohn, John A.
- Krehbiel, Keith
Abstract
Reconciliation has become a regular feature of the congressional budget process. We address the question of whether or under what conditions the budget process with reconciliation (modeled as selection of the size of the budget first and its division second) produces smaller budgets than a piecemeal appropriations process in which the size of the budget is determined residually. The theoretical result is that reconciliation sometimes results in relatively large budgets. A testable implication of the theory is that given a choice of how stringently reconciliation is to be employed, congressmen will jointly consider preferences and the expected outcomes under the available institutional arrangements and select the arrangement (usually a rule) that yields the most favorable outcome. Empirical results from the budget process in the House from 1980-83 are generally supportive of the hypothesis of rational choice of institutional arrangements which is derived from the theory.
Additional Information
Published as Ferejohn, John, and Keith Krehbiel. "The budget process and the size of the budget." American Journal of Political Science (1987): 296-320.Attached Files
Submitted - sswp572.pdf
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Additional details
- Alternative title
- The Budget Process and the Size of the Budget
- Eprint ID
- 81497
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170915-145457916
- Created
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2017-09-15Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 572