Published September 15, 2017
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Theories of Price Formation and Exchange in Double Oral Auctions
- Creators
- Easley, David
- Ledyard, John O.
Abstract
We provide a theory to explain the data generated by Double Oral Auctions. The primary conclusion suggested by Double Oral Auction experiments is that the quantities exchanged and the prices at which transactions take place converge to, or near to, the values predicted by the competitive equilibrium model. Our theory predicts convergence to the competitive equilibrium and provides an explanation of disequilibrium behavior. The predictions of our theory fit the data better than do the predictions of Walrasian, Marshallian or game theoretic models.
Additional Information
Revised. Original dated to March 1981. This paper benefited from discussions in seminars at Cornell, Northwestern, Stonybrook, and an NSF Conference on Experimental Economics at the University of Arizona. This version is significantly different from earlier versions. We would like to thank Vernon Smith and Arlington Williams for making data on their Plata DOA experiments available to us. Published as Easley, David, and John Ledyard. "Theories of price formation and exchange in double oral auctions." The double auction market: Institutions, theories, and evidence 15 (1993).Attached Files
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 81417
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170913-133503410
- Created
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2017-09-15Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 611