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Published September 15, 2017 | Submitted
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Agendas, Strategic Voting, and Signaling with Incomplete Information

Abstract

The literature on agendas with sincere and strategic voting represents an important contribution to our understanding of committees, of institutions, and of the opportunities to manipulate outcomes by the manipulation of institutions. That literature, though, imposes an assumption that may be unrealistic in many situations; namely, that everyone knows the preferences of everyone else. In this essay we apply Bayesian equilibrium analysis to show that the properties of agendas that others derive assuming complete information do not hold necessarily under incomplete information. First, a Condorcet winner need not be selected, even if nearly everyone on the committee most prefers it. Second, the "2 step theorem," that any outcome reachable in n voting stages via some amendment agenda is reachable in two stages under sophisticated voting, need not hold. Third, nonbinding votes such as straw polls, can critically effect final outcomes.

Additional Information

This research was supported by National Science Foundation grants to Carnegie-Mellon University and to the University of Texas at Austin. We also wish to acknowledge, in the case of one author, the support of Stanford's Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences. Published as Ordeshook, Peter C., and Thomas R. Palfrey. "Agendas, strategic voting, and signaling with incomplete information." American Journal of Political Science (1988): 441-466.

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