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Published September 11, 2017 | Submitted
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Sophisticated Sincerity: Voting Over Endogenous Agendas

Abstract

The empirical findings on whether or not legislators vote strategically are mixed. This is at least partly due to the fact that to establish any hypothesis on strategic voting, legislators' preferences need to be known; and these are typically private data. In this note it is shown that, under complete information, if decision-making is by the amendment procedure and if the agenda is set endogenously, then sophisticated (strategic) voting over the resulting agenda is observationally equivalent to sincere voting. The voting strategies, however, are sophisticated. This fact has direct implications for empirical work on sophisticated voting.

Additional Information

I am grateful to Richard McKelvey and to the referees for comments on an earlier version of this paper. They bear no responsibility for any remaining shortcomings. This research is supported by NSF grant SES-8600965. Published as Austen-Smith, David. "Sophisticated sincerity: voting over endogenous agendas." American Political Science Review 81.4 (1987): 1323-1330.

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