Sincere Voting in Models of Legislative Elections
- Creators
- Austen-Smith, David
Abstract
An assumption of sincere voting for one's most preferred candidate is frequently invoked in models of electoral competition in which the elected legislature consists of more than a single candidate or party. Voters, however, have preferences over policy outcomes--which are determined by the ex post elected legislature--and not over candidates per se. This observation provokes the following question. For what methods of translating election results into legislative policy outcomes is sincere voting rational in the legislative election? This paper provides the answer. One of the principal implications is that for sincerity to be rational, there necessarily exists a candidate for office whose electoral platform is the final legislative outcome, whether or not that candidate is elected to the legislature.
Additional Information
Much of this paper is a result of the efforts of John Ledyard to understand what I was trying to say about the problem. I am extremely grateful for his help, and for his insistence that I look for a theorem and not simply a set of examples. I am also grateful to Kim Border for providing a proof for one of the results. Despite their input, I retain all responsibility for any remaining errors and ambiguities. Published as Austen-Smith, David. "Sincere voting in models of legislative elections." Social Choice and Welfare 6.4 (1989): 287-299.Attached Files
Submitted - sswp637.pdf
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 81310
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170911-142742977
- Created
-
2017-09-11Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 637