Published September 11, 2017
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Preparing for the Improbable: Safety Incentives and the Price-Anderson Act
- Creators
- Dubin, Jeffrey A.
- Rothwell, Geoffrey S.
Abstract
The Price-Anderson Act requires commercial nuclear power plants to maintain (approximately) $660 million in off-site accident coverage through two forms of insurance: market-provided private insurance and self-insurance in the form of retrospective assessments of reactor owners. We examine how changes in retrospective assessments influence the safety incentives of nuclear reactor owners. As one would expect, increases in self-insurance premiums increase the incentive to install safety systems more quickly. However, a more important conclusion is that self-insurance premiums as a function of reactor riskiness, rather than equal payments by reactor owners, yield a higher level of safety than under the current law.
Additional Information
While many people have assisted our research, some stand out for their special contributions: David Cain, Paul David, Peter Navarro, W. Edward Steinmueller, and particularly, Roger Noll. Remaining errors are our own. This research was funded by grants from the Exxon Educational Foundation to the Environmental Quality Laboratory at the California Institute of Technology and from the Center for Economic Policy Research at Stanford University.Attached Files
Submitted - sswp642.pdf
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 81297
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170911-133209283
- Exxon Educational Foundation
- Created
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2017-09-11Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 642