Published September 8, 2017
| Submitted
Report
Open
Private Incentives in Social Dilemmas: The Effect of Incomplete Information and Altruism
- Creators
- Palfrey, Thomas R.
- Rosenthal, Howard
Abstract
This paper analyzes the provision of discrete public goods when individuals have altruistic preferences which others do not precisely know. The problem is formulated and solved as a Bayesian game. In contrast to standard social psychological approaches, based on such natural language terms as greed, fear, and trust, the Bayesian approach provides a rigorous mathematical treatment of social participation. This theory is shown to make strong testable predictions that can integrate data collected across a wide variety of natural and experimental settings. The al truism model is shown to be supported by existing experimental data on binary voluntary contribution games.
Additional Information
Published as Palfrey, Thomas R. and Rosenthal, Howard (1988) Private incentives in social dilemmas: The effects of incomplete information and altruism. Journal of Public Economics, 35 (3). pp. 309-332.Attached Files
Submitted - sswp659.pdf
Files
sswp659.pdf
Files
(568.1 kB)
Name | Size | Download all |
---|---|---|
md5:6fa9dddf3cc1e5f6e79c205c4aff9aac
|
568.1 kB | Preview Download |
Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 81250
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170907-151800608
- Created
-
2017-09-08Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
-
2019-11-22Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 659