Published February 1997
| public
Journal Article
The Maximal Number of Regular Totally Mixed Nash Equilibria
- Creators
- McKelvey, Richard D.
- McLennan, Andrew
Abstract
LetS=∏^n_(i=1) S_ibe the strategy space for a finite n-person game. Let (s_(10),…, s_(n0))∈Sbe any strategyn-tuple, and let T_i=S_i−{s_(i0)},i=1, …, n. We show that the maximum number of regular totally mixed Nash equilibria of a game with strategy sets S_iis the number of partitions P={P_1,…,P_n} of ∪_i T_i such that, for each i, |P_i|=|T_i| and P_i∩T_i=∅. The bound is tight, as we give a method for constructing a game with the maximum number of equilibria. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number C72.
Additional Information
© 1997 Academic Press. Received 26 July 1994, Revised 5 February 1996. This research was supported in part by National Science Foundation Grant SBR-9308862 to the University of Minnesota and Grant SBR-9308637 to the California Institute of Technology. We benefited from stimulating discussions with Victor Reiner and Michel Le Breton, and an anonymous referee made many excellent suggestions.Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 81185
- DOI
- 10.1006/jeth.1996.2214
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170906-095820143
- SBR-9308862
- NSF
- SBR-9308637
- NSF
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2017-09-06Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2021-11-15Created from EPrint's last_modified field