Published May 1991
| public
Journal Article
Dynamic tariffs with asymmetric information
- Creators
- Riezman, Raymond
Abstract
Recent developments in dynamic game theory are applied to determine when two countries can sustain freer trade given that they determine trade policies non-cooperatively. Countries know their own level of protection, but not the other country's level of protection. Using import trigger strategies, cooperation (in the form of low tariffs) can be supported, although there are periodic reversionary (high tariff) episodes. However, if terms of trade trigger strategies are used, cooperation does not occur.
Additional Information
© 1991 Elsevier B.V. Received June 1989, revised version received September 1990. I thank Pat Conway, Russell Cooper, Avinash Dixit, James Friedman, Howard Gruenspecht, John Kennan, Ramon Marimon, Doug McManus, Roger Myerson, Rob Porter, Jennifer Reinganum, participants at the Mid-West International Economics Group meetings, the University of Western Ontario, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions.Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 81173
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170906-074249890
- Created
-
2017-09-06Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
-
2021-11-15Created from EPrint's last_modified field