Published November 1989
| Submitted
Working Paper
Open
Expert Opinions and Taxpayer Compliance: A Strategic Analysis
Chicago
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Abstract
In this paper we examine the incentives for taxpayers to claim risky deductions and to solicit expert opinions to support their positions, and for the tax agency to distinguish among individuals who do and do not solicit expert opinions for the purposes of auditing. We also consider the implications of an ex ante constraint on the tax agency which requires it to treat all taxpayers who take the deduction alike in terms of audit rates, whether or not they solicit an expert opinion. Finally, we examine the effects of regulations which limit the degree of riskiness for which a supporting opinion can be justified as well as the effects of changes in various penalty rates.
Additional Information
Revised version. Original dated to July 1988. Professor Graetz thanks the National Science Foundation for research support (grant no. SES-870443) as do Professors Reinganum and Wilde (grant nos. SES-8903157 and SES-8902545).Attached Files
Submitted - sswp710.pdf
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 81106
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170901-153557344
- NSF
- SES-870443
- NSF
- SES-8903157
- NSF
- SES-8902545
- Created
-
2017-09-05Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
-
2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 710