Published January 1997
| Published
Journal Article
Open
Preferences Over Solutions to the Bargaining Problem
- Creators
-
Border, Kim C.
- Segal, Uzi
Abstract
There are several solutions to the Nash bargaining problem in the literature. Since various authors have expressed preferences for one solution over another, we find it useful to study preferences over solutions in their own right. We identify a set of appealing axioms on such preferences that lead to unanimity in the choice of solution, which turns out to be the solution of Nash.
Additional Information
© 1997 The Econometric Society. We gratefully acknowledge stimulating suggestions from Larry Epstein, Peter Eso, Itzhak Gilboa, Ehud Kalai, Edi Karni, Bart Lipman, Joe Ostroy, Bob Pollak, Ariel Rubinstein, Zvi Safra, Lloyd Shapley, Joel Sobel, Dan Vincent, Bill Weiss, Bill Zame, the co-editor, two anonymous referees, and seminar participants at Caltech, Johns Hopkins, Northwestern, and Washington University. Uzi Segal also thanks the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for financial support.Attached Files
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 81002
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170830-160727267
- Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC)
- Created
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2017-08-30Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2021-11-15Created from EPrint's last_modified field