Some Properties of Hare Voting with Strategic Voters
- Creators
- Ordeshook, Peter C.
- Zeng, Langche
Abstract
This essay examines some properties of the Single Transferable Vote (Hare Voting) procedure for electing candidates in multi-member districts under the assumption that all voters are strategic. From the perspective of the most common criterion for evaluating voting procedures - the extent to which they ensure the eventual selection of Condorcet winning candidates - the results we offer in this essay can be interpreted as indictments of STY. Even if we restrict preferences by imposing conditions on attitudes towards risk and assume a strong form of separability, STY is not necessarily incentive compatible and strategic voting does not ensure the selection of Condorcet winning candidates or of Condorcet outcomes. This fact, moreover is not dependent on the existence of "bogus" equilibria - outcomes that exclude Condorcet candidates cannot be avoided under all circumstances even if we limit our analysis to strong or to individually stable equilibria.
Additional Information
Published as Ordeshook, Peter C., and Langche Zeng. "Some properties of hare voting with strategic voters." Public Choice 78, no. 1 (1994): 87-101.Attached Files
Submitted - sswp772.pdf
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 80988
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170830-145105291
- Created
-
2017-08-30Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 772