Published May 1998
| Published
Journal Article
Open
Delegation and the Regulation of Risk
- Creators
- Lohmann, Susanne
- Hopenhayn, Hugo
Abstract
Political principals typically use low-cost "fire-alarm" signals transmitted by the media, interest groups, and disaffected constituents to monitor the activities of regulatory agencies. We argue that regulatory decision making is biased and inconsistent if the instruments of political oversight are simple and the information flows to the principal are coarse relative to the complexity of the regulatory environment.
Additional Information
© 1998 Academic Press. Received 14 November 1995.Attached Files
Published - 1-s2.0-S0899825697906230-main.pdf
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- Eprint ID
- 80935
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170829-160244581
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2017-08-30Created from EPrint's datestamp field
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2021-11-15Created from EPrint's last_modified field