Published March 1993
| Submitted
Working Paper
Open
A Note on Sequential Auctions
- Creators
- Bernhardt, Dan
- Scoones, David
Chicago
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Abstract
This note provides an explanation for the 'declining-price anomaly' in sequential second price auctions. We illustrate how the average winning bids of risk neutral agents bidding for objects with valuations drawn from independent, identical distributions are lower in later auctions than in earlier auctions. When the objects are not identical we determine the optimal order in which they should be auctioned.
Additional Information
We are grateful to Anne Sholtz, Ruqu Wang and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. Both authors acknowledge financial support from SSHRC. We are responsible for any errors that remain. Published as Bernhardt, Dan, and David Scoones. "A note on sequential auctions." The American economic review 84, no. 3 (1994): 653-657.Attached Files
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 80822
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170825-162510308
- Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC)
- Created
-
2017-08-28Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
-
2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 829