Published August 18, 2017
| Submitted
Report
Open
Outside Options and Social Comparison in 3-Player Ultimatum Game Experiments
- Creators
- Knez, Marc
-
Camerer, Colin F.
Abstract
We conducted ultimatum games in which a proposer offers a division of $10 to a respondent, who accepts or rejects it. If an offer is rejected, players receive a known outside option. Our proposers made simultaneous offers to two respondents, with outside options of $2 and $4. The rate of rejected offers was higher than in similar studies, around 50%, and persisted across five trials. Outside options seem to make players "egocentrically" apply different interpretations of the amount being divided, which creates persistent disagreement. And half of respondents demand more when they know other respondents are being offered more.
Additional Information
We thank participants in the Social Organization of Competition Workshop (U Chicago) and the Behavioral Decision Research in Management conference (Boston, May 1994), and the referees and special issue editor Tom Palfrey, for extremely helpful comments. Published as Knez, Marc J., and Colin F. Camerer. "Outside options and social comparison in three-player ultimatum game experiments." Games and Economic Behavior 10, no. 1 (1995): 65-94.Attached Files
Submitted - sswp920.pdf
Files
sswp920.pdf
Files
(706.6 kB)
| Name | Size | Download all |
|---|---|---|
|
md5:2abf751f6a1f3135393e8a6009da43e7
|
706.6 kB | Preview Download |
Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 80628
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170818-144943716
- Created
-
2017-08-18Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
-
2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 920