Published August 18, 2017
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Relationship Banking and corporate governance in the Kaiserreich
- Creators
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Fohlin, Caroline
Abstract
This paper focuses on the institution of interlocking directorates between universal banks and industrial firms in the Kaiserreich (1871-1914) and demonstrates that such formalized relationships were unusual prior to 1900. The investigation indicates further that there was a marked increase in bank representation at firms-both in the share of firms involved in such relationships and in the number of joint directors-around the turn of the century. Finally, the work suggest a number of explanations for the pattern of bank relationships that emerges.
Additional Information
My thanks go to Lance Davis, Barry Eichengreen, Harold James, John Latting, and Ken Snowden as well as EHA conference participants for their comments on this work Funding from the Joint Committee on Western Europe of the American Council of Learned Societies and the Social Science Research Council (with Funds provided by the Ford and Mellon Foundations) is gratefully acknowledged. Renamed and published as Fohlin, Caroline. "The rise of interlocking directorates in imperial Germany." The Economic History Review 52, no. 2 (1999): 307-333.Attached Files
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 80593
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170817-165303443
- Created
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2017-08-18Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 931