Published March 1998
| Published
Working Paper
Open
Repeated Implementation
- Creators
- Kalai, Ehud
- Ledyard, John O.
Chicago
An error occurred while generating the citation.
Abstract
In the traditional static implementation literature it is often impossible for implementors to enforce their optimal outcomes. And when restricting the choice to dominant-strategy implementation, only the dictatorial choices of one of the participants are implementable. Repeated implementation problems are drastically different. This paper provides a strong implementation "folk theorem": for patient implementors, every outcome function they care about is dominant-strategy implementable.
Additional Information
Revised version. Original dated to August 1996. The authors wish to thank Andreas Blume, Tim Feddersen, Alvaro Sandroni, and a referee of JEL for helpful suggestions. Kalai's research is partly supported by NSF Economics Grant No. SBR-955421. Ledyard's research is partly supported by the New Millennium Project Office of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory of NASA. Published as Kalai, E., & Ledyard, J.O. (1998). Repeated implementation. Journal of Economic Theory, 83(2), 308-317.Attached Files
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 80328
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170811-163520727
- NSF
- SBR-955421
- New Millennium Project Office, JPL
- Created
-
2017-08-11Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
-
2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 1027