Published August 11, 2017
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The econometrics and behavioral economics of escalation of commitment: A re-examination of Staw & Hoang's NBA data
- Creators
-
Camerer, Colin F.
- Weber, Roberto A.
Abstract
We examine the phenomenon of escalation from an economist's perspective, emphasizing explanations which do not rule out rational behavior on the part of firms or agents. We argue that escalation cannot be established as a separate phenomenon unless these possible alternative explanations are properly accounted for. We present Staw and Hoang's (1995) study of NBA data as an instance of where evidence of escalation might be overturned upon more careful analysis. After performing several tests of our alternative explanations, we find that evidence of escalation persists, although it is weaker both in duration and magnitude.
Additional Information
We thank Amanda Rosenberg and Gail Nash for data entry, and participants at the Psychology-Economics Conference, Vancouver BC (June 6-7 1997), Linda Babcock, Max Bazerman, Richard Day, David Grether, Chip Heath, Keith Murnighan, Tom Ross, Barry Staw, Keith Weigelt and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. Published as Camerer, C.F., & Weber, R.A. (1999). The econometrics and behavioral economics of escalation of commitment: A re-examination of Staw and Hoang's NBA data. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 39(1), 59-82.Attached Files
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 80306
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170811-142521643
- Created
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2017-08-11Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 1043