Published November 1998
| Submitted
Working Paper
Open
Platonic Mechanism Design
- Creators
- Title, Leslie Rachel
Chicago
An error occurred while generating the citation.
Abstract
We characterize the class of tiered exchange functions for an assignment problem. We examine a model with a finite number of indivisible goods to be assigned to a finite number of individuals with status quo endowments. However, these individuals can be partitioned into tiers, and new axioms of social justice are developed to account for this tiering.
Additional Information
Thanks to John Ledyard, Matt Jackson, Simon Wilkie, Kim Border, Edward Fine, and the members of the SSGSSS for their comments and infinite patience.Attached Files
Submitted - sswp1047.pdf
Files
sswp1047.pdf
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 80303
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170811-140442145
- Created
-
2017-08-11Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
-
2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 1047