An Epistemic Characterization of Extensive Form Rationalizability
Abstract
We use an extensive form, universal type space to provide the following epistemic characterisation of extensive form rationalisability. Say that player i strongly believes event E if i is certain of E conditional on each of her information sets consistent with E. Our main contribution is to show that a strategy profile s is extensive form rationalisable if and only if there is a state in which s is played and (0) everybody is rational, (1) everybody strongly believes (0), (2) everybody strongly believes (0) & (1), (3) everybody strongly believes (0) & (1) & (2), .... This result also allows us to provide sufficient epistemic conditions for the backward induction outcome and to relate extensive form rationalisability and conditional common certainty of rationality.
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 80380
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170810-154039653
- Created
-
2017-08-15Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 1009