Published August 9, 2017
| Submitted
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A Solution to Matching with Preferences over Colleagues
- Creators
-
Echenique, Federico
- Yenmez, M. Bumin
Abstract
We study many-to-one matchings, such as the assignment of students to colleges, where the students have preferences over the other students who would attend the same college. It is well known that the core of this model may be empty, without strong assumptions on agents' preferences. We introduce a method that finds all core matchings, if any exist. The method requires no assumptions on preferences. Our method also finds certain partial solutions that may be useful when the core is empty.
Additional Information
We thank Chris Chambers, Gary Lorden, and seminar audiences at the University of Arizona, Brown, UCLA, and Princeton, for comments. We are also grateful to Caltech for a SURF fellowship awarded to Yenmez.Attached Files
Submitted - sswp1226.pdf
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sswp1226.pdf
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 79969
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170808-153108432
- Caltech Summer Undergraduate Research Fellowship (SURF)
- Created
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2017-08-09Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2019-11-26Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 1226