Trade rules for uncleared markets
- Creators
- Kıbrıs, Özgür
- Kucuksenel, Serkan
Abstract
We analyze markets in which the price of a traded commodity is such that the supply and the demand are unequal. Under standard assumptions, the agents then have single peaked preferences on their consumption or production choices. For such markets, we propose a class of Uniform Trade rules each of which determines the volume of trade as the median of total demand, total supply, and an exogenous constant. Then these rules allocate this volume "uniformly" on either side of the market. We evaluate these "trade rules" on the basis of some standard axioms in the literature. We show that they uniquely satisfy Pareto optimality, strategy proofness, no-envy, and an informational simplicity axiom that we introduce. We also analyze the implications of anonymity, renegotiation proofness, and voluntary trade on this domain.
Additional Information
We gratefully acknowledge Ipek Gursel for a very useful observation. We also thank William Thomson, Tayfun Sonmez, Utku Unver, Anirban Kar as well as the seminar participants at Sabanci University, Koc University, ASSET 2004, SED 2004, and the Murat Sertel Memorial Conference on Economic Theory for their comments and suggestions on an earlier version of this paper.Attached Files
Submitted - sswp1232.pdf
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 79956
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170808-143010615
- Created
-
2017-08-09Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 1232