Published August 9, 2017
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Citizen Candidates Under Uncertainty
- Creators
- Eguia, Jon X.
Abstract
In this paper we make two contributions to the growing literature on "citizen-candidate" models of representative democracy. First, we add uncertainty about the total vote count. We show that in a society with a large electorate, where the outcome of the election is uncertain and where winning candidates receive a large reward from holding office, there will be a two-candidate equilibrium and no equilibria with a single candidate. Second, we introduce a new concept of equilibrium, which we term "sincere-strategic," and we show that with this refinement, the two equilibrium candidates will not be too extreme, one will lean to the left and the other one to the right.
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 79951
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170808-142212101
- Created
-
2017-08-09Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
-
2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 1233