Welcome to the new version of CaltechAUTHORS. Login is currently restricted to library staff. If you notice any issues, please email coda@library.caltech.edu
Published August 9, 2017 | Submitted
Report Open

Finite Perfect Information Extensive Games with Generic Payoffs

Abstract

In finite perfect information extensive (FPIE) games, backward induction (BI) gives rise to all pure-strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibria, and iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies (IEWDS) may give different outcomes for different orders of elimination. Duggan recently posed several conjectures in an effort to better understand the relationship between BI and IEWDS in FPIE games. One conjecture states that the unique BI strategy profile in FPIE games with generic payoffs is guaranteed to survive IEWDS when all weakly dominated strategies are eliminated at every round. This paper exhibits a counterexample to this conjecture.

Additional Information

I thank the Caltech SURF program for funding and Federico Echenique for advice.

Attached Files

Submitted - sswp1235.pdf

Files

sswp1235.pdf
Files (150.1 kB)
Name Size Download all
md5:6bfd604d578c0c401b6c2abc785679c5
150.1 kB Preview Download

Additional details

Created:
August 19, 2023
Modified:
January 13, 2024