Published August 9, 2017
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Finite Perfect Information Extensive Games with Generic Payoffs
- Creators
- Hummel, Patrick
Abstract
In finite perfect information extensive (FPIE) games, backward induction (BI) gives rise to all pure-strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibria, and iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies (IEWDS) may give different outcomes for different orders of elimination. Duggan recently posed several conjectures in an effort to better understand the relationship between BI and IEWDS in FPIE games. One conjecture states that the unique BI strategy profile in FPIE games with generic payoffs is guaranteed to survive IEWDS when all weakly dominated strategies are eliminated at every round. This paper exhibits a counterexample to this conjecture.
Additional Information
I thank the Caltech SURF program for funding and Federico Echenique for advice.Attached Files
Submitted - sswp1235.pdf
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 79943
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170808-134943416
- Caltech Summer Undergraduate Research Fellowship (SURF)
- Created
-
2017-08-09Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 1235