Published September 2002
| Submitted
Working Paper
Open
Core Many-to-one Matchings by Fixed-Point Methods
- Creators
-
Echenique, Federico
- Oviedo, Jorge
Chicago
Abstract
We characterize the core many-to-one matchings as fixed points of a map. Our characterization gives an algorithm for finding core allocations; the algorithm is efficient and simple to implement. Our characterization does not require substitutable preferences, so it is separate from the structure needed for the non-emptiness of the core. When preferences are substitutable, our characterization gives a simple proof of the lattice structure of core matchings, and it gives a method for computing the join and meet of two core matchings.
Additional Information
We are grateful to Alejandro Neme and Ruth MartÃnez for their helpful comments. Published as Echenique, Federico and Oviedo, Jorge (2004) Core many-to-one matchings by fixed-point methods. Journal of Economic Theory, 115 (2). pp. 358-376.Attached Files
Submitted - sswp1140.pdf
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 79789
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170802-154832632
- Created
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2017-08-02Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
-
2019-11-26Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 1140