Published November 2002
| Submitted
Working Paper
Open
Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments Among Players
- Creators
-
Jackson, Matthew O.
- Wilkie, Simon
Chicago
An error occurred while generating the citation.
Abstract
We characterize the outcomes of games when players may make binding offers of strategy contingent side payments before the game is played. This does not always lead to efficient outcomes, despite complete information and costless contracting. The characterizations are illustrated in a series of examples, including voluntary contribution public good games, Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly, principal-agent problems, and commons games, among others.
Additional Information
We thank Ken Hendricks, Philippe Jéhiel, Ehud Kalai, Roger Lagunoff, Bentley MacLeod, Nolan Miller, Hakan Orbay, Mike Peters, and seminar participants at the University of Arizona, Caltech, University of Texas, University of Toronto, U.B.C., USC, and the Decentralization Conference for helpful comments and suggestions. Financial support under NSF grants SES-9986190 and SES-9986676 is gratefully acknowledged. Published as Jackson, M.O., & Wilkie, S. (2005). Endogenous games and mechanisms: Side payments among players. The Review of Economic Studies, 72(2), 543-566.Attached Files
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 79771
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170802-133314873
- NSF
- SES-9986190
- NSF
- SES-9986676
- Created
-
2017-08-02Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
-
2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 1150