Published December 2002
| Submitted
Working Paper
Open
Non-Excludable Public Good Experiments
Chicago
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Abstract
We conducted a two-stage game experiment with a non-excludable public good. In the first stage, two subjects choose simultaneously whether or not they commit to contributing nothing to provide a pure public good. In the second stage, knowing the other subject's commitment decision, subjects who selected not to commit in the first stage choose contributions to the public good. We found no support for the evolutionary stable strategy equilibrium, and the ratio of subjects who did not commit to contributing nothing increased as rounds advanced; that is, the free-riding rate declined over time. Furthermore, this behavior did not arise due to altruism or kindness among subjects, but from spiteful behavior of subjects.
Additional Information
Orig May 1997; revised October 2002. We thank Takenori Inoki, Mamoru Kaneko, Hajime Miyazaki, Toru Mori, Mancur Olson, Mitsuo Suzuki, two anonymous referees, and participants at the Fall 1996 Economic Science Association conference for their helpful comments and discussions. This research was partially supported by the Zengin Foundation for the Studies on Economics and Finance, Grant in Aid for Scientific Research 08453001 of the Ministry of Education, Science and Culture in Japan, and the Tokyo Center for Economic Research Grant. Published as Cason, T.N., Saijo, T., Yamato, T., & Yokotani, K. (2004). Non-excludable public good experiments. Games and Economic Behavior, 49(1), 81-102.Attached Files
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 79728
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170801-170555282
- Zengin Foundation for the Studies on Economics and Finance
- Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT)
- 08453001
- Tokyo Center for Economic Research
- Created
-
2017-08-02Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
-
2020-03-09Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 1154