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Published August 1, 2017 | Submitted
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What Matchings Can Be Stable? The Refutability of Matching Theory

Abstract

When can a collection of matchings be stable, if preferences are unknown? This question lies behind the refutability of matching theory. A preference profile rationalizes a collection of matchings if the matchings are stable under the profile. Matching theory is refutable if there are observations of matchings that cannot be rationalized. I show that the theory is refutable, and provide a characterization of the matchings that can be rationalized.

Additional Information

I thank David Ahn, Chris Chambers, Alekos Kechris, Hideo Konishi, Tayfun Sonmez and seminar audiences at UC Berkeley, Boston College, and audiences at the Wallis/Thomson Conference and the Caltech SISL retreat.

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August 19, 2023
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January 13, 2024