Published August 1, 2017
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Voting Blocs, Coalitions and Parties
- Creators
- Eguia, Jon X.
Abstract
In this paper I study the strategic implications of coalition formation in an assembly. A coalition forms a voting bloc to coordinate the voting behavior of its members, acting as a single player and affecting the policy outcome. I prove that there exist stable endogenous voting bloc structures and in an assembly with two parties I show how the incentives to form a bloc depend on the types of the agents, the sizes of the parties, and the rules the blocs use to aggregate their preferences. I also provide an empirical application of the model to the US Supreme Court and I show that justices face a strategic incentive to coalesce into voting blocs.
Additional Information
I thank Francis Bloch, Anna Bogomolnaia, Matias Iaryczower, Matt Jackson, Andrea Mattozzi and Tom Palfrey for their comments and suggestions. I am grateful to Andrew Martin and Keith Poole for their generous help with the US Supreme Court data.Attached Files
Submitted - sswp1257.pdf
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 79671
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170801-095722280
- Created
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2017-08-01Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 1257