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Published August 1, 2017 | Submitted
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A Theory of Stability in Many-to-many Matching Markets

Abstract

We develop a theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets. We give conditions under which the setwise-stable set, a core-like concept, is nonempty and can be approached through an algorithm. The setwise-stable set coincides with the pairwise-stable set, and with the predictions of a non-cooperative bargaining model. The set-wise stable set possesses the canonical conflict/coincidence of interest properties from many-to-one, and one-to-one models. The theory parallels the standard theory of stability for many-to-one, and one-to-one, models. We provide results for a number of core-like solutions, besides the setwise-stable set.

Additional Information

We thank John Duggan for several useful discussions. Part of this paper was written during a visit to the Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Universidad de la República, in Uruguay. Published as Echenique, F. and Oviedo, J. (2006) A theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets. Theoretical Economics, 1(2):233-273.

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August 19, 2023
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