Published September 2009
| Submitted
Working Paper
Open
Network Architecture, Salience and Coordination
Chicago
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Abstract
This paper reports the results of an experimental investigation of monotone games with imperfect information. Players are located at the nodes of a network and observe the actions of other players only if they are connected by the network. These games have many sequential equilibria; nonetheless, the behavior of subjects in the laboratory is predictable. The network architecture makes some strategies salient and this in turn makes the subjects' behavior predictable and facilitates coordination on efficient outcomes. In some cases, modal behavior corresponds to equilibrium strategies.
Additional Information
Revised version. Original: July 2008. This research was supported by the Princeton Laboratory for Experimental Social Science (PLESS) and the UC Berkeley Experimental Social Science Laboratory (Xlab). The paper has benefited from suggestions by the participants of seminars at several universities. We acknowledge The National Science Foundation for support under grants SBR-0095109 (Gale), SES-0617955 (Gale and Kariv), and SES-0617820 (Palfrey) and The Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation (Palfrey). Kariv is grateful for the hospitality of the School of Social Science in the Institute for Advanced Studies. Published as Choi, Syngjoo and Gale, Douglas and Kariv, Shachar and Palfrey, Thomas. (2011) Network architecture, salience and coordination. Games and Economic Behavior, 73(1):76-90.Attached Files
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 79517
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170727-165659587
- NSF
- SBR-0095109
- NSF
- SES-0617955
- NSF
- SES-0617820
- Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation
- Princeton Laboratory for Experimental Social Science (PLESS)
- UC Berkeley Experimental Social Science Laboratory (Xlab)
- Created
-
2017-08-02Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
-
2019-11-22Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 1291