Published December 2012
| Submitted
Working Paper
Open
How to control controlled school choice
- Creators
-
Echenique, Federico
- Yenmez, M. Bumin
Chicago
Abstract
We characterize choice rules for schools that regard students as substitutes, while at the same time expressing preferences for the diversity composition of the student body. The stable (or fair) assignment of students to schools requires the latter to regard the former as substitutes. Such a requirement is in conflict with the reality of schools' preferences for a diverse student body. We show that the conflict can be useful, in the sense that certain unique rules emerge from imposing both considerations.
Additional Information
We thank Estelle Cantillon for her helpful comments, as well as seminar audiences at MIT/Harvard, ECARES, Sciences-Po, University of Arizona, University of California-Davis, University of California-Irvine, University of Montreal.Attached Files
Submitted - sswp1366.pdf
Files
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 79480
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170727-090931100
- Created
-
2017-08-07Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
-
2019-11-26Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 1366