Scheduling Auctions and Proto-Parties in Legislatures
- Creators
- Čopič, Jernej
- Katz, Jonathan N.
Abstract
We consider the impact of the scarcity of plenary time in legislatures both on the outcome of the legislative bargaining process and the organization of the legislature itself. We do so by developing a novel model that we call scheduling auctions. In the model, the legislature is charged with allocating a fixed budget. Members can propose an allocation and the scheduling agent decides which one of the possible proposals will be considered by the entire legislature in plenary session for an up or down vote. We show in this simple setting that deciding which member should be selected as the scheduling agent endogenously induces the creation of nascent political parties that we call proto-parties. We also show that the these legislative structures have positive welfare implications.
Additional Information
We are grateful to David Baron, Douglas Bernheim, Gary Cox, Daniel Diermeier, Harold Demsetz, Timothy Feddersen, Matias Iaryczower, Matthew Jackson, Matt Kahn, Preston McAfee, Kenneth Shepsle, Guido Tabellini, Barry Weingast, and William Zame, as well as seminar audiences at WZB, UCSD, Universidad de Granada, and CERGE.Attached Files
Submitted - sswp1387.pdf
Files
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 79438
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170726-143507538
- Created
-
2017-08-07Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
-
2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 1387